JACKSON-VANIK: Its Origin and Impact as Russia Nears “Graduation” by Korey, William
JACKSON-VANIK:
Its Origin and Impact as Russia Nears “Graduation”
William Korey
Introduction
As Congress moved in the spring of 2002 to 
end a quarter-century legislative trade sanction 
upon Russia—the historic Jackson-Vanik 
amendment—the leading voice on human rights in 
the Congress, Representative Tom Lantos (D. - 
A.) waxed eloquent in praise of the amendment 
and what it had accomplished. Its “legacy” of 
using trade for human rights purposes, if at the 
time “unprecedented,” should serve, he believed, 
as a frame of reference for future congressional 
legislation.
Lantos was not alone in according enthusiastic 
recognition of the amendment’s impact. As early 
as 1987, an almost forgotten scholarly study by the 
Twentieth Century Fund of prevailing emigration 
policies and practices of governments throughout 
the world, lauded the amendment as “the single 
most effective step” taken by the United States 
with what the author called “the new serfdom.”1 
The reference was to the policy and practice of 
sharp restrictions upon emigration which was 
especially characteristic at the time of communist 
states.
But, the Twentieth Century Fund study was 
scarcely dominant then in policy-making circles. 
Former President Richard Nixon’s essays in the 
eighties on foreign affairs were remarkably 
influential and, he insisted, Jackson-Vanik 
constituted a monumental blunder. Only “quiet 
diplomacy,” he maintained, would remove 
restrictions upon Jewish emigration from the 
USSR.2 Soviet leaders “will give more in private 
than they will in public.” Not public legislation, 
but rather private “quiet diplomacy” will produce a 
positive outcome.
Equally critical and far more influential in 
foreign policy circles were the views of Nixon’s
National Security Advisor and later Secretary of 
State, Henry A. Kissinger. In his Years of 
Upheaval, he vigorously argued that Soviet rulers 
would perceive any public demand by foreign 
sources for a modification of their domestic 
practices as “a direct impairment of their 
authority.”3 In his view, the Kremlin leaders 
“could not possibly change their policies in 
response to an act of a capitalist legislature....” 
Even after hundreds of thousands of Jews and 
other ethnic groups had emigrated from the Soviet 
Union and its successor states, Kissinger continued 
to castigate Jackson-Vanik. In his volume, 
Diplomacy,4 published in 1994, he denounced the 
amendment without, however, repeating his 
obviously outdated argument in Years of 
Upheaval.
Still, the perspective of the Twentieth Century 
Fund on Jackson-Vanik was very much the 
perspective of activist Soviet Jews from the very 
beginning of the struggle for that amendment. 
And, a similar attitude was held by American Jews 
for whom the amendment served as a powerful 
weapon in their historic struggle on behalf of their 
brethren held in virtual bondage with respect to 
emigration. As significant was the perception of 
the modem world’s greatest humanist, Nobel 
Laureate Andrei D. Sakharov. He had extended 
the amendment a unique and unprecedented 
endorsement as a “policy of principle” that could 
have extraordinary ramifications.
Yet the enactment of the Jackson-Vanik 
amendment was by no means quick and easy. It 
required a two-year legislative struggle involving 
intense battles with a determined Nixon 
Administration, bolstered by powerful corporate 
interests. At the center of the struggle stood Henry 
M. Jackson, a senior U.S. senator (D.-WA.) who
1 Alan Dowty, Closed Borders (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1987), p. 231.
2 Richard Nixon, “Hard-Headed Detente,” The New York 
Times, August 18, 1982, p. A21.
3 Henry Kissinger, Years of Upheaval (Boston: Little, Brown 
and Co., 1982), pp. 250-51,254.
4 Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York: Simon & Schuster, 
1994), pp. 753-54.
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espoused a vigorous civil liberties perspective 
joined to a pronounced anti-Soviet posture. When 
Senator Jackson formally introduced his 
amendment on the Senate floor on March 15, 
1973, he specifically referred to Article 13/2 of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which 
holds that “everyone has the right to leave any 
country, including his own, and to return to his 
country,” as the principal source of inspiration for 
the proposed legislation.5 The crucial importance 
ascribed to this fight was evident from the three- 
year study by the United Nations Subcommission 
on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of 
Minorities. It found that the right is “a constituent 
element of personal liberty” and a precondition for 
the exercise of other human rights. Indeed, the 
principle this right upholds has been the 
cornerstone of international law since the Magna 
Carta.6
The relevance of the Declaration of Human 
Rights to the Jackson-Vanik amendment was 
critical. Sakharov was to underscore it in an “open 
letter” to the U.S. Congress. In it, he spoke of the 
appropriateness of the declaration for legislative 
action in that it would attach a “minimal 
condition” for the consummation of detente 
agreements involving trade. The U.S. Congress, 
after all, reflected “the traditional love of freedom 
of the American people.” Senator Jackson went 
beyond this general point to a specific attribute of 
American tradition, the country’s basic character 
as a “nation of immigrants,” which justified the 
introduction of the amendment. It is precisely 
because of this character, he insisted, that freedom 
of emigration is “an American issue.” Jackson 
reminded his colleagues that “I would not be in 
this chamber today if Norway, the country of my 
parents’ birth, had practiced the sort of emigration 
policy that the Soviet Union has today.”
Origins
Jackson’s initiative was sparked by an 
extraordinary decision of the Soviet government: 
the enactment, on August 3, 1972, of a decree 
requiring would-be emigrants who had acquired a 
higher education to pay a “diploma tax.” On 
August 14, the decree was reaffirmed by an 
“order” of the USSR Council of Ministers, 
directing appropriate Soviet agencies to establish a 
scale of fees. These were so exorbitantly high that 
payment by those holding advanced degrees was 
virtually impossible. Soviet Jewish activists, at a 
an August 15 press conference, warned that the 
effect of the decree would be the creation of “a 
new category of human beings—the slaves of the 
20ih century.”7 The diploma tax was but the latest 
of a massive series of devices created by the 
Kremlin to stop the drain of talent. Even as the 
barrier to emigration was lifted in March 1971, and 
the flow of 13,000 Jews to Israelwas increased to 
32,000 in 1972, the highly educated and 
technically trained were compelled to run an 
obstacle course of prolonged torment.
The Kremlin had not reckoned with the 
revulsion the tax would generate in the United 
States. Especially shocked were the scientific and 
academic communities. Twenty-one Nobel 
laureates issued a public statement in the fall of 
1972 expressing “dismay” at the “massive 
violation of human rights” by the imposition of 
“exorbitant head taxes.” At an emergency meeting 
of the leadership of national Jewish organizations, 
called for September 26 in Washington, D.C., by 
the National Conference on Soviet Jewry (NCSJ), 
it was decided to move from a largely public- 
relations campaign to a predominantly political 
one focusing on a particular piece of legislation. 
Senator Jackson, who had asked to be invited to 
the gathering, outlined to the 120 participants a 
legislative proposal tying trade benefits to removal 
of curbs on emigration.8
In part, the Jackson proposal was a response to 
negotiations for a comprehensive trade agreement 
that had been carried on between American and 
Soviet officials since the beginning of August. 
The provisions of the agreement, as finally signed
5 See Congressional Record-Senate, Vol. 119, No. 41, March 
15, 1973. An earlier version was introduced in the late fall, 
1972.
6 See William Korey, The Soviet Cage: Anti-Semitism in Russia 
(New York: Viking Press, 1973), pp. 184-86.
7 Ibid., pp. 315-17
8 Jerry Goodman, “Protecting Human Rights Around the 
World: The Case of Soviet Jewry.” In Mare Godin, Mark 
Levine and Sid Schwarz, Jewish Civics: A Tikkun 01am 
Manual (Washington, D.C.: The Institute for Jewish Leadership 
and Values, n.d.), pp. 71-73. Also see William Korey, NGOs 
and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (New York, St. 
Martin’s Press, 1998), pp. 190-202.
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by the two powers in October, were that the United 
States was to receive from the USSR $722 million 
of the enormous lend-lease debt owed it since 
World War II; in return, the administration pledged 
to seek congressional authorization for providing 
to the Soviet Union most-favored-nation (MFN) 
tariff treatment. By early October 1972, Senators 
Jackson and Abraham Ribicoff (D. - CONN.) had 
gathered thirty-two sponsors for their proposal, 
which they offered as an amendment to an East- 
West trade bill. Senator Jacob Javits (R. - NY) 
joined when it was somewhat modified, bringing 
with him thirty more senators.
The amendment would refuse a “nonmarket 
economy country” MFN (most favored nation) 
status, as well as credits, credit guarantees, and 
investment guarantees, if that country denied its 
citizens the right to emigrate, or imposed more 
than a nominal tax on emigration. At the time, 
observers viewed the Senate action as a show of 
strength and a warning to the Russians, rather than 
a serious legislative move.
Early in January 1973, Representative Charles 
A. Vanik (D. - OH.) had assembled a list of 144 
representatives who agreed to sponsor in the 
House legislation similar to Jackson’s amendment. 
A massive letter-writing campaign sponsored by 
the NCSJ and organized Jewry was to evoke a 
powerful response. Support for the amendment 
also came from other sources, including the trade- 
union movement and several religious groups. By 
early February, 238 representatives, more than a 
majority of the House, had decided to become 
cosponsors of the proposed legislation.
The Soviet authorities initially sought to meet 
congressional action head-on. The major target 
was to be big business in the United States, which 
was thought to be most susceptible to Soviet 
blandishments.9 A high-level 15 member Soviet 
delegation arrived to participate in an American- 
Soviet trade conference sponsored by the National 
Association of Manufacturers (NAM). At the
9 Details of the overall struggle on Jackson-Vanik are to be 
found in William Korey, “The Struggle over Jackson-Mills- 
Vanik,” American Jewish Year Book, 1974-75 (New York: The 
American Jewish Committee and The Jewish Publication 
Society of America, 1975), pp. 199-234. The author, as a 
professional participant in the policy deliberation of the Jewish 
community, kept detailed notes of the discussions. When not 
directly involved in the private policy meetings of the top 
Jewish leaders with key senators and government officials, he 
relied on personal oral reports from those leaders about the 
session. Details from the notes and interviews were recorded in 
the Year Book essay as well as in a subsequent one published 
the following year.
opening session in Washington on February 27, 
which was attended by 800 businessmen, no less 
than three powerful Soviet officials served as panel 
members.
The Soviet panelists quickly learned where 
Congress stood. Senator Edmund S. Muskie (D. - 
ME.) told them that Soviet emigration policy 
constituted a “major roadblock” to expanded East- 
West trade. An official Soviet response came the 
next day. Georgy Arbatov, reportedly the 
Politburo’s principal adviser on American 
questions, said at a briefing session that if 
“normalization of trade relations between the U.S. 
and USSR is frustrated by the Congress,” it would 
prove “a harmful thing for Soviet-American 
relations” as a whole. Should the Jackson-Vanik 
legislation be adopted, Arbatov warned, it would, 
among other things, “revive anti-Semitism in the 
Soviet Union.”
The Russians by no means relied exclusively 
on the Arbatov-type threats. They also focused the 
softer line of economic inducements on 
congressmen, with NAM providing the required 
link to the Hill. On March 12, Deputy Trade 
Minister Vladimir Alkhimov and two Soviet 
Embassy economic officials met with fifteen 
congressmen, among them key Republicans, at a 
luncheon requested by the Soviet Embassy and 
arranged by NAM officials to explain the 
advantages of increased U.S.-Soviet trade.
On March 15, 1973, Senator Jackson formally 
reintroduced his amendment on the Senate floor. 
In introducing his amendment, Jackson said its 
“heart” was the provision making MFN status and 
U.S. Export-Import Bank credits contingent on 
periodic presidential reports to Congress on 
compliance with the free emigration requirements 
by the country in question. Senator Ribicoff put 
the issue sharply, warning that Congress was not 
“bluffing,” and that “the next move is up to the 
Soviet Union.” Moscow no doubt got the 
“message” when large majorities in both houses of 
Congress—75 senators and 272 congressmen— 
agreed to cosponsor the amendment.
Washington must have received assurances that 
the USSR would alter, at least in some degree, its 
emigration procedures. Secretary of the Treasury 
George P. Shultz had met on March 14 with 
President Brezhnev and spoke of Soviet leaders 
showing “willingness to tackle [the emigration 
problem] in very real terms.” Indeed, only four 
days after the Shultz visit, Moscow signaled a 
clearly positive, if limited, response to the pressure
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of Congress.10 *On March 19-20, 1973, the USSR 
allowed forty-four Soviet Jews who had obtained a 
higher education to leave without paying the 
diploma tax. On March 21, the Israeli daily Yediot 
Aharonot published an article by Viktor Louis, a 
Soviet journalist with close KGB connections, 
which said the diploma tax “will no longer be 
enforced.”
Senator Jackson, speaking at the National Press 
Club in Washington, welcomed the Moscow 
developments as “encouraging signs,” but also 
made it clear that he would continue to press for 
his amendment to ensure that Moscow did not 
“relapse into the old patterns” of harassment and 
taxation to limit emigration. The issue, it was 
clear, remained the right to leave a country.
The Role of the Jewish Community
The Nixon Administration shifted to the 
political offensive that would in part seek to 
neutralize or weaken the Jewish community’s 
support for the amendment, thereby isolating 
congressional opposition. On April 10, President 
Nixon sent Congress a comprehensive Trade 
Reform Act with the stated goal of “creating a new 
international economic order.” The administration 
followed up with a direct approach to the Jewish 
community." At Nixon’s invitation, fifteen 
prominent Jewish leaders who had long sought a 
meeting with the president to discuss the totality of 
the Soviet Jewish problem, but with one exception 
had been unsuccessful, received invitations from 
the White House. Now it was the president who 
sought the meeting, which lasted seventy minutes 
and ranged over central aspects of the Soviet 
Jewish problem. Inevitably, the impact on the 
Jewish participants was powerful, especially since 
Nixon showed sympathetic understanding of the 
problem. Most important, he explained to them 
the profound moral dilemma in which he found 
himself. On the one hand, he had made a 
commitment to the Kremlin on MFN status that 
was perceived as integral to his search for detente. 
On the other hand, there was the Jackson 
amendment, which would negate that commitment.
Delivered in a delicate manner, the message 
was clear. The White House hoped the Jewish
10 William Korey, "Jackson-Vanik and Soviet Jewry,” The 
Washington Quarterly, Winter 1984, pp. 119-20.
For the pressure on the Jewish community leadership and the 
reactions, see Korey, "The Struggle Over Jackson-Mills- 
Vanik," op. cit., pp. 215-20.
community would reconsider its adamant support 
of the Jackson amendment. The strategy appears 
to have temporarily succeeded. After the meeting, 
Jacob Stein, chairman of the Conference of 
Presidents of Major American Jewish 
Organizations; Charlotte Jacobson, vice chair of 
the National Conference on Soviet Jewry; and Max 
Fisher, former president of the Council of Jewish 
Federations and Welfare Funds, issued a statement 
on behalf of all participants that was as revealing 
for what it did not say as for what it said. It noted 
the contents of the Soviet documents concerning 
eased Soviet emigration practices, and “asked the 
help of the president for the 100,000 Soviet Jews 
who had been refused exit visas.” The statement’s 
failure to include any reference to the Jackson 
amendment raised doubts on Capitol Hill about the 
firmness of the Jewish community’s position.
The very ambiguity of the statement stirred a 
grassroots backlash. Pressure for clarification 
rapidly mounted among the organizations 
composing the NCSJ. Parallel and interlocked 
with this pressure were demands by the 
amendment’s leading sponsors for a strong 
statement of support, without which their ability to 
hold congressional supporters in line was open to 
question.
Jewish leaders were faced with a dilemma that 
they had sought to avoid. Until their meeting at 
the White House, they had made every effort to 
present publicly their support of the Jackson 
amendment as in no way directed against the 
president. On the contrary, they had argued, 
support of the amendment aided the president’s 
“quiet diplomacy” by strengthening his hand in 
negotiating with the Russians. Now, the leaders 
felt, they were being pressured into making a 
choice between support of the White House and 
support of the Jackson amendment. They were 
keenly aware that Nixon had been a friend of Israel 
and continued to aid the Jewish state.
A decisive consideration in resolving the 
dilemma was the attitude of Soviet Jewry. Just as 
Soviet Jews had played the key role in sparking the 
extraordinary American Jewish mass movement in 
late 1970 on behalf of their emigration rights, so, 
too, was their opinion key at this juncture. When 
reports about an apparent ambiguity concerning 
American Jewish support for the Jackson 
amendment reached Moscow, Soviet Jewish 
activists decided to intervene directly. On April 
23, 1973, they sent an appeal bearing more than 
one hundred signatures to American Jewish 
leaders, urging them to continue backing the
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amendment. Their language was strong and 
designed to remind American Jewry of the 
Holocaust. The closing paragraph was particularly 
poignant: “Remember, the history of our people 
has known many terrible mistakes. Do not give in 
to soothing deceit. Remember, your smallest 
hesitation may cause irreparable tragic results.”
Clarification of the Jewish community’s 
position was pressed at an enlarged executive 
committee meeting of the NCSJ on April 26. It 
reached the decision that a prompt public 
statement of support for the amendment was 
essential. Later at a meeting of the Presidents’ 
Conference a statement was hammered out 
declaring that the Jackson amendment had 
“contributed” to the alleviation of “the plight of 
Soviet Jewry, and we continue our support for this 
legislation.”
While the administration was unable to sway 
Congress, Leonid Brezhnev thought he might try 
during a scheduled trip to the United States in mid- 
June. Two days after his arrival, he met with 
seventeen members of the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee and eight members of the 
House, and outlined the prospects for vast Soviet- 
American trade. After some time, he emphasized 
rather vigorously that the condition for such trade 
was MFN status for the Soviet Union.
Brezhnev received a more enthusiastic 
reception from forty of America’s top industrial 
and banking executives, invited by Secretary 
Shultz to a meeting at Blair House on the morning 
of June 22. They were enormously impressed by 
the broad picture Brezhnev painted of the potential 
of trade relations between the two countries. Yet, 
for all his lobbying, Brezhnev failed to achieve his 
primary objective of winning over Congress for the 
administration’s trade bill. The large majority in 
both the Senate and the House had not retreated 
from support of the Jackson amendment. The 
amendment now had 77 sponsors in the Senate and 
285 in the House. The legislative session, which 
resumed in September 1973, was marked by an 
intensification of the struggle between the White 
House and Congress over the trade bill.
The Andrei Sakharov Factor
A new factor in the debate was Andrei 
Sakharov’s decision to enter directly into the 
controversy.12 His “open letter” to the Congress, 
dated September 14, appealed for support of the 
Jackson amendment. Its passage, he said, was an 
indispensable first step to assuring detente. In his 
view, the “minimal right” of emigration is essential 
for “mutual trust” and, therefore, detente. To 
reject Jackson-Vanik would be nothing short of “a 
betrayal of the thousands of Jews and non-Jews 
who want to emigrate, of the hundreds in camps 
and mental hospitals, of the victims of the Berlin 
Wall.”
The immediate test of strength between the 
administration and the Jackson coalition was in the 
House Ways and Means Committee. The 25- 
member panel had been under pressure from 
business circles, including Donald M. Kendall, 
chairman of the newly formed Emergency 
Committee on American Trade. But the charged 
moral-political atmosphere flowing from the 
Sakharov issue all but neutralized that pressure. 
The House committee voted on MFN status on 
September 26. By a voice vote, it agreed to deny 
MFN status to nonmarket counties restricting 
emigration. However, the administration 
succeeded in seriously weakening the bill through 
an unexpected parliamentary maneuver. Before 
the vote was taken, the ranking Republican 
member of the Ways and Means Committee 
suddenly, on a point of order, asked that the 
provision barring credits and credit guarantees be 
eliminated. He contended that this section fell 
under the jurisdiction of the House Banking and 
Currency Committee. The chair ruled in his favor.
The committee decision on the bill, while not 
completely to the liking of the Jackson coalition, 
was an important setback to the administration. 
President Nixon, with Kissinger at his side, met at 
the White House with the Republican leaders of 
Congress and urged a determined effort to 
eliminate the restrictions placed on granting MFN 
status to the USSR.
The Jackson coalition was equally determined 
to restore the provision on credits. In a speech on 
the Senate floor on September 27, Jackson called 
the House committee vote “a most welcome
12 The Sakharov role is detailed in William Korey, “Sakharov 
and the Soviet Jewish National Movement,” Midstream, 
February 1974, pp. 43-44. A copy of Sakharov’s letter is in the 
author’s possession. Sakharov refers to the episode in his 
memoirs. See Andrei Sakharov, Memoirs (New York: Alfred 
A. Knopf, 1990), pp. 394, 402-4.
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affirmation of the commitment of this country to 
the cause of human rights,” but expressed regret 
that “a vital part of the Jackson amendment” had 
been dropped on grounds of “a jurisdictional 
question.” Bank credits were far more crucial than 
Soviet manufactured goods, which, in the 
immediate future, were most unlikely to find a 
market in the United States for a variety of 
economic reasons. Credits, on the other hand, 
involved the very hard reality of trade.
Before the bill came up for final vote in the 
House (scheduled for October 17 or 18), fighting 
had broken out in the Middle East. The Yorn 
Kippur War significantly affected the character of 
the debate and the strategic maneuvering behind 
the scenes. For one, the Jewish community, the 
principal public backer of the Jackson amendment, 
was now chiefly concerned with Israel’s survival. 
At the same time, a major objective of American 
foreign policy was to bring about a cease-fire in 
the Middle East, which required the cooperation of 
the Soviet Union.
Kissinger felt that the time was not opportune 
for a House vote on the Trade Reform Act, and 
that passage of the Jackson amendment would 
jeopardize Soviet cooperation in ending hostilities. 
On October 11, he urged the House leadership to 
postpone the vote in “the best interests of the 
country.” The request was approved by House 
leaders. Consideration of the trade bill was 
scheduled for October 24 or 25. But as the time 
for the vote approached, Middle East tensions had 
not been resolved. The two cease-fires reached on 
October 22 or 24 appeared threatened. Kissinger 
again sought delay.
At this point, a curious episode took place. On 
October 23, Kissinger, who had just that day 
returned from his whirlwind trip to Moscow, Tel 
Aviv, and London, met at the White House with 
Stein, Richard Maass (chairman of NCSJ), and 
Fisher. Toward the end of the meeting, which 
mainly focused on Middle East matters, Kissinger 
raised the issue of the Jackson amendment. He 
reiterated that the president favored its elimination 
from the Trade Reform Act, and then surprised his 
listeners by asking whether, in the event Jackson 
and Vanik agreed to the elimination of the 
amendment, the Jewish leadership would condemn 
them. Since the Jewish leaders did not know 
whether Jackson or Vanik had been approached by 
the White House, their answer was evasive. If 
indeed Jackson or Vanik agreed with Kissinger, 
they said, they would have to ask their 
constituency for instructions on how to proceed.
The White House reinforced the Kissinger 
tactic. Peter Flanigan, its chief adviser on 
international economic policy, told Jewish leaders 
that the interest of Israel required the elimination 
of Title IV (Jackson-Vanik). He proposed on 
November 2 that the leadership meet with Vanik 
and Jackson concerning this objective. Jewish 
leaders had been scheduled to see Jackson on 
November 5. During the preceding weekend, 
word of the administration proposal leaked out and 
quickly generated a chorus of anger and concern. 
The executive committee of the NCSJ rejected the 
Kissinger and Flanigan proposal. Instead, Maass 
was instructed to report to Jackson on the White 
House position, and to seek his counsel.
The November 5 session with Jackson was the 
turning point in the yearlong campaign. The 
senator chose to invite to it, in addition to Maass, 
Stein, his principal legislative partner, Senator 
Ribicoff. After Maass reported on the 
conversations with administration officials, 
Jackson and Ribicoff addressed the source of the 
Jewish community’s anxiety: that continued 
support of the amendment might undermine or 
weaken U.S. support of Israel. In their view, the 
linkage was spurious.
After the meeting, Stein and Maass 
immediately went to the White House to advise 
Flanigan that the organized Jewish community 
would continue to back the Jackson amendment. 
The following week, Maass issued a public 
statement to this effect. It made clear that backing 
the amendment did not mean the Jewish leadership 
had cut its ties with the Nixon administration, or 
did not appreciate its massive aid to Israel. What 
the leadership rejected, Maass emphasized, was 
the attempt to use that aid to weaken or remove the 
Jackson amendment.
On December 10, the trade bill was finally 
called up for action in the House. The key vote 
came a day later on a motion by Vanik to refuse 
credits, credit guarantees, and investment 
guarantees to nonmarket countries denying ‘their 
citizens emigration rights. The overwhelming 4 to 
1 ratio in the voting (319 to 80) testified to the 
massive support enjoyed by the Jackson coalition 
in the House. Then, by a ratio almost as large (298 
to 106), the House defeated an administration- 
sponsored motion to delete Title IV from the bill.
The collapse of Nixon’s strategy compelled the 
administration to shift in 1974 to a new approach. 
Kissinger had to recognize the political reality that 
more than three-quarters of the Senate supported
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the House-approved legislation.13 *He therefore, for 
the first time, entered into negotiations with the 
principal sponsors of the amendment, Senators 
Jackson, Ribicoff, and Javits. The purpose of the 
negotiations, which continued throughout the 
spring, was to find a formula to make the Jackson 
amendment acceptable to the administration and to 
the Kremlin. Ineluctably, the administration was 
compelled to conduct parallel and interlocking 
discussions with Soviet officials to determine what 
concessions.the Kremlin was prepared to make to 
satisfy the Senate. Kissinger frequently met with 
Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin, and saw 
Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko at 
Geneva in April and at Cyprus in May, to discuss 
the matter.
Two aims were central to these discussions: 
ending the harassment of Soviet Jews who applied 
for exit visas, and raising the level of Jewish 
emigration. (The rate of Jewish emigration during 
the first half of 1974 had declined by 40 percent.) 
Concerning the first point, Gromyko at Cyprus was 
prepared to acknowledge that such practices were 
“inconsistent with Soviet laws.” With reference to 
the level of emigration, he proposed a figure of 
45,000. The three senators suggested 75,000 as a 
desirable number.
Reaching a Ford-Congress Agreement
The accession of Gerald Ford to the presidency 
on August 9 was a decisive development. Not 
only was Ford, in the calculations of the Kremlin, 
an uncertain factor as far as detente was 
concerned, he had also committed himself, in his 
first public act, to a “marriage” with Congress. 
The Kremlin moved rapidly. Three days after 
Ford’s inauguration, Dobrynin interrupted his 
vacation to fly to Washington, and the two met on 
August 14 to discuss the trade measure. The 
discussion was clearly encouraging. The president 
called the three senators to the White House the 
following morning and offered them his personal 
guarantee that the Kremlin was prepared to end 
harassment of Jewish applicants and to raise 
significantly the level of emigration.
The administration-Senate negotiations now 
entered their final stage. Initially, the negotiators 
agreed that Kissinger would write a letter spelling 
out the Soviet commitment on eased emigration
13 For details, see William Korey, “The Struggle Over the 
Jackson Amendment,” American Jewish Year Book, 1975 (New
York: The American Jewish Committee and The Jewish 
Publication Society of America, 1976), pp. 160-70.
procedures. Upon the insistence of the new NCSJ 
chairman, Stanley H. Lowell, it was agreed that the 
letter would refer to “assurances” rather than a 
vaguer term. Jackson would then respond by 
giving his interpretation of the agreement, 
indicating a precise figure of 60,000 as the 
emigration rate—a compromise between the earlier 
figures.
As the negotiations proceeded, the Soviet 
Union was kept apprised of, and appeared to 
accept, the understandings that were being 
reached. Indeed, on September 20, President Ford 
met successively with Jackson and Gromyko on 
the basic content of the proposed exchange of 
correspondence, and later that day, Kissinger and 
Gromyko talked about it at length. In essence, the 
Kremlin had become a “silent partner” to an 
administration-Senate understanding.
Announcement of the understanding was made 
by Senator Jackson on October 18. Kissinger’s 
letter stated that “punitive action” against would- 
be emigrants and “unreasonable impediments” 
would no longer obtain. Only in the case of 
persons holding “security clearances” would 
“limitations of emigration” be imposed, and then 
only for a designated time period. Senator 
Jackson’s response translated the assurances into 
specific terms. With respect to “security 
clearance” cases, he set a date of three years from 
the time they had been exposed to sensitive 
information. As a “benchmark, a minimum 
standard of initial compliance,” Jackson set an 
emigration figure of 60,000 per annum. He added 
that “we understand that the president proposes to 
use the same benchmark.” On the basis of these 
understandings, Jackson agreed to propose an 
additional amendment that would authorize the 
president to waive for a period of eighteen months, 
Title IV restrictions with respect to MFN status 
and credits. Thereafter, the presidential waiver 
authority could be extended, on a one-year basis, 
by concurrent resolutions of both houses of 
Congress.
A week after the Kissinger-Jackson exchange, 
Gromyko handed Kissinger, who was then in 
Moscow, a letter dated October 26, which 
complained that the letters presented a “distorted 
picture of our position.” It stated that “we 
resolutely decline” the interpretation of 
“elucidations that were furnished by us” on 
emigration practices as involving “some 
assurances and nearly obligation on our part.” The 
Gromyko letter was kept from the Senate—and the 
public. Kissinger made no reference to it during
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his crucial testimony in support of the Trade 
Reform Act before the Senate Finance Committee 
on December 3. He nonetheless insisted that 
“assurances” on emigration had been given by 
Brezhnev, Gromyko, and Dobrynin.
On December 13, the Senate, by a vote of 88 to 
0, approved the waiver provision, with the proviso 
that the president certify to the Congress that “he 
has received assurances that the emigration 
practices” of the USSR will “lead substantially to 
the achievement of the objectives” of the Jackson 
amendment.14 But on the moi'nmg of December 
18, Moscow suddenly decided to react publicly to 
the trade measure. Its comments were unusually 
negative. The official Soviet news agency, Tass, 
asserted that “leading circles” in the USSR flatly 
reject as “unacceptable” any attempt to attach 
conditions to the reduction of tariffs on imports 
from the Soviet Union, or otherwise to “interfere in 
[its] internal affairs.” The statement denied that 
the Kremlin had given any specific assurances on 
emigration procedures. To support its contention, 
Tass released the Gromyko letter of October 26.
The Tass release revealed a totally new 
Kremlin attitude. Prior to December 18, the 
Kremlin failed to indicate publicly that it had 
second thoughts about the understandings reached 
between the White House and Senator Jackson, to 
which it was a silent partner. What brought the 
changed perspective? Analysis suggests that it 
was triggered by another congressional action 
completely unrelated to the Jackson amendment.
By December 16, it had become clear to the 
Kremlin that the Senate was about to approve an 
amendment to a bill that extended the life of the 
U.S. Export-Import Bank for four years. The 
amendment, sponsored by Senator Adlai E. 
Stevenson III, would place a ceiling of only $300 
million on credits to the USSR over the entire four- 
year period. It had been initially voted on 
favorably by the Senate on September 19. As the 
House version of the Export-Import Bank bill 
contained no similar amendment, the issue went 
before a Senate-House conference committee, 
which adopted the ceiling on December 12. The 
Senate then began considering the conference 
report, and after several sessions—the last on
December 16—appeared almost certain to adopt 
it.15
As Kissinger later indicated, the. amount of 
credits permitted the USSR under the ceiling was 
“peanuts in Soviet terms.” As compared to more 
than $1 billion in credits it sought for the next 
three years, the proposed $75 million per annum 
was a severe disappointment. From the Kremlin’s 
perspective, the bargain that had been struck 
involving an agreed-upon exchange of money 
credits for emigrants had been unfavorably altered.
Significantly, Ambassador Dobrynin met with 
Kissinger on December 18 and, in a reportedly 
stormy session, lashed out at the credit ceiling and 
warned that the October 1972 trade agreement 
would thereby be placed in jeopardy. At the same 
time, Tass had issued its statement denying any 
assurances on emigration. The connection seemed 
clear. Moscow was saying that if the ceiling on 
credits was imposed, the trade deal with the 
exchange was jeopardized. The linked Soviet 
actions of December 18 were clearly designed to 
stir State Department lobbying in the Senate. But 
the last-minute lobbying, if intensive, proved 
unavailing. On December 19, the Senate approved 
the conference report even as the State Department 
denounced the Stevenson amendment as “most 
unwise and unfortunate.”
The puzzling question is why the 
administration failed to alert public opinion and the 
Congress as to what the Stevenson amendment 
involved in relation to the understandings reached 
on the Jackson amendment. Strikingly, Jewish 
organizations, which had a great stake in the 
emigration issue, were totally unaware of the 
Stevenson amendment and its potential 
consequences. Kissinger was reported to have 
admitted to his aides that he failed to focus on the 
Export-Import Bank bill and the Stevenson 
amendment when he should have done so.
An attack would now be mounted by the 
Kremlin against the entire Trade Reform Act. On 
December 20, both the Senate and the House 
approved the act by large majorities. The very 
next day, Tass unleashed the new propaganda 
offensive, denouncing both the Trade Reform Act 
and the Export-Import Bank legislation as 
“attempts at interference in the internal affairs of
14 For details on the last minute blow-up on the three-way 
understanding, see William Korey, “The Future of Soviet 
Jewry: Emigration and Assimilation,” Foreign Affairs, Fall, 
1979, pp. 75-77. Also see Korey “Jackson-Vanik and Soviet 
Jewry,” op. cit., pp. 122-24. (The latter appeared in The 
Washington Quarterly five years after the author’s Foreign 
Affairs essay.)
15 For detailed coverage of the Stevenson amendment and its 
impact upon Moscow, see Paula Stem, Water’s Edge: Domestic 
Politics and the Making of American Foreign Policy (Westport: 
Greenwood Press, 1979), pp. 181-89 and 238 (fn. 137). Stem 
relied, as did the author, on extensive reportage of the episode 
in The New York Times, December 21-23, 1974.
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the USSR.” Several weeks later, the Kremlin 
formally scrapped the October 1972 trade 
agreement.
The Trade Reform Act, with its historic 
Jackson-Vanik amendment, became law on 
January 3, 1975, when President Ford signed the 
legislation. Even before the Jackson-Vanik became 
law, it had compelled the Kremlin, in an 
unprecedented act, to nullify an education tax on 
exit visas. Nor would Moscow choose to disregard 
the message of Jackson-Vanik, even after its 
vehement media outburst of December 1974. 
After 1975, the annual emigration rate of Soviet 
Jews rose, jumping to 28,000 in 1978 and an 
unprecedented 51,000 in 1979. During 1978-79, a 
draft strategic arms limitation agreement (SALT 
II) occupied a key place on the American-Soviet 
agenda, and Moscow sought to win support for 
Senate ratification of the treaty. Preliminary 
discussions concerning trade and credits were also 
taking place at the time.
Strikingly, in 1978 the United States reached a 
trade agreement with the Soviet satellite state of 
Hungary. That agreement was preceded by written 
exchanges in which Budapest gave assurances on 
its emigration practices. Had Moscow continued 
to have strong objections to the amendment as an 
intrusion into domestic affairs, it would no doubt 
have pressured Hungary to reject the agreement.
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 
December 1979 brought an end to the warming 
trend with the West. The resumption of an even 
more frigid cold war ineluctably followed, with a 
concomitant downward plunge of Jewish 
emigration rates. By 1986, the figure had reached 
the lowest level since the sixties.
With the emergence of glasnost and perestroika 
following Mikhail Gorbachev’s coming to power, 
a new era in East-West relations appeared on the 
horizon. It found expression in the Helsinki 
process talks held in Vienna, especially during 
1987. Moscow would commit itself to free 
emigration and the removal of virtually all 
obstacles to it. Even on the core issue of the 
national security device designed to inhibit 
emigration, Moscow was prepared to impose 
“stringent time limits” on the “state secrets” 
obstacle. Gorbachev himself made this 
commitment in an address to the United Nations 
General Assembly bn December 7, 1988.
Emigration and Waiver
Central to Jackson-Vanik was less the 
commitments, but rather the actual flow of 
emigrants. Implementation constituted the heart of 
the amendment and explains why Senator Jackson 
insisted a “benchmark” of 60,000 emigrants per 
annum as essential for determining whether a 
waiver of his statute was to be granted. From 1989 
onward, that “benchmark” was annually reached 
and, indeed, exceeded.16 In 1989, it was 72,000, 
and then jumped to 213,000 in 1990 and 180,000 
in 1991. Since 1992, the annual emigration 
remained fairly high even if 1989-92 figures 
inevitably diminished.
Appropriately, the waiver was granted, and the 
Soviet Union and its successor states, most notably 
Russia, were extended MFN status and Export- 
Import Bank credits on an annual basis. The very 
existence of the Jackson-Vanik amendment, 
together with the annual review, provided the 
leverage for assuring continuing compliance. 
President Boris Yeltsin, in view of Russia’s 
positive record, and eager to remove any obstacles 
to American investment and trade, sought to have 
Jackson-Vanik entirely revoked. When he met 
with President Bill Clinton in Vancouver, Canada, 
in April 1993 at their first summit, he vigorously 
pressed the issue.
At the press conference that climaxed the 
meeting, Yeltsin observed that the two leaders had 
“decided to do away with the Jackson-Vanik 
amendment.” The comment was hardly accurate. 
Clinton, in his press comments, had merely 
indicated that, only after the White House is 
certain that restrictions on emigration are no longer 
implemented, would he then be prepared to 
recommend to Congress that the legislation be 
reconsidered. The next year, Russian Prime 
Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin came to 
Washington armed with positive details. It was on 
June 21, 1994 that he met with several Jewish 
leaders brought together by the NCSJ. Besides 
noting the continuing high level of exodus, 
Chernomyrdin could call attention to the sharp 
decline in the number of refuseniks. A specially 
created commission in Russia, headed by Sergei 
Lavrov, had reviewed 139 key refusenik cases and 
approved 135. Since then, the refusenik category 
plunged downward, laying the groundwork for a 
change in Russia’s MFN status.
16 The emigration figures were made available to the author by 
the National Conference on Soviet Jewry.
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But that change would not and could not mean 
that Jackson-Vanik no longer applied to Russia. 
That is precisely what Chernomyrdin sought (as 
had Yeltsin in Vancouver). Enlightenment was 
provided by the late Senator Jackson’s 
collaborator, former Congressman Charles Vanik. 
As an invited member of the NCSJ delegation, he 
told the Russian prime minister that the Jackson- 
Vanik amendment was “firm as concrete” in both 
American law and the American mind. Besides, 
only Congress, not the president, can remove 
Russia from the Jackson-Vanik rubric.
Still, a significant step under Jackson-Vanik 
could be taken in recognizing Russia’s 
compliance. President Clinton, with the support of 
NCSJ, formally affirmed on September 21, 1994, 
Moscow’s “full compliance” with Jackson-Vanik. 
This affirmation permitted Russia to obtain MFN 
status and Export-Import Bank credits without an 
annual review (by both the administration and the 
Congress). The removal of the burdensome annual 
review was strongly welcomed by President 
Yeltsin.
From 1994 to the present, the waiver provision 
remained a constant feature of the American- 
Russian trade relationship. The President 
repeatedly used the waiver as he made his annual 
determination of Russia’s compliance with the 
requirements of Jackson-Vanik. While the 
compliance determination is vulnerable to a 
resolution of disapproval by Congress—as 
indicated in the amendment—no such resolution 
has taken place since 1994 and, indeed, not a 
single member of Congress has even asked for 
disapproval.
Nor would a disapproval resolution make much 
sense as every year since 1994, until 2000 the 
Jewish emigration figures from Russia exceeded 
the Jackson 60,000 benchmark, although at an 
increasingly smaller rate. During the last two 
years, over 100,000 have emigrated. Indeed, the 
total number of emigrants from the former Soviet 
Union offers an extraordinary endorsement of the 
purpose of Jackson-Vanik. The overall figure is a 
staggering one and one-half million, with the 
number going to Israel only exceeding one million. 
Jews from the former Soviet Union constitute 
approximately 18 percent of the total population 
making them the largest single ethnic group within 
Israel. Their impact upon Israeli society in 
technological, scientific and cultural terms has 
been enormous.
Moving Toward “Graduation”
After September 11, 2001, the U.S. position on 
Russia’s strong reaction to Jackson-Vanik 
ineluctably required modification from relative 
indifference to a vigorous responsiveness. Russia, 
after all, had been especially cooperative in joining 
President Bush’s campaign against terrorism. At 
the very first summit of the two Presidents, after 
the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and 
the Pentagon, which was held in Crawford, Texas, 
on November 13-15, Vladimir Putin was in a 
position to raise the issue of Jackson-Vanik rather 
forcefully and Bush was unlikely to be indifferent 
to his plea.
Two initiatives were quickly taken on the very 
first day of the summit. At a joint press briefing, 
President Bush noted that Russia had made 
“important strides” on emigration and on “the 
protection of religious and ethnic minorities.”17 
President Putin observed that they had reached “a 
great deal of understanding” that issues separating 
the two countries “should be resolved” including 
dealing specifically with the Jackson-Vanik 
amendment in “legal terms.” The second initiative 
involved a formal exchange of correspondence 
between Secretary of State Colin Powell and 
Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov on precisely 
the same day, November 13.18
Ivanov promised that Jews and all ethnic 
groups of Russia will “enjoy the right to leave the 
country and travel abroad.” And he emphasized 
that the Kremlin “guarantees” its Jewish 
community “protection against any type of 
religious and ethnic discrimination.” Powell 
responded by welcoming Ivanov’s “commitment to 
human rights, including freedom of emigration” 
and his view that “anti-Semitism has no place in 
modem society.” The Ivanov letter indicated that 
he had been assured that the Bush Administration 
would “seek the full and final exemption of 
Russia” from Jackson-Vanik, which he called “one 
of the last vestiges of the so-called Cold War.”
Far more important than these initiatives was 
the commitment given by President Bush at the 
summit. As reported in the Congressional 
Research Service “he will work with the [U.S.] 
Congress to grant Russia permanent ‘normal trade
17 Excerpts of the press conference were made available to the 
author by NCSJ.
18 Complete copies of the exchange were made available by 
NCSJ. They are in the possession of the author.
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relations’ (PNTR) status.”19 Bush was, of course, 
keenly aware that the Jackson-Vanik amendment 
could only be modified by new congressional 
legislation. Section 401 of Title IV of the 1974 
Trade Reform Act—the Jackson-Vanik 
amendment—specifically embraced the former 
Soviet Union and the bulk of its successor states.
The Bush Administration was as good as its 
word concerning positive action in the Congress. 
It prompted two key legislators to introduce bills 
only one month after the Crawford summit which 
would grant Russia permanent normal trading 
relations with the U.S. Indeed, the draft bill in the 
Senate (S. 1861) was openly acknowledged, by its 
sponsor, Senator Richard Lugar (R. - IND.), to 
have been introduced by him “at the request of the 
Administration.”20 No doubt, the same “request” 
was made of the sponsor of the House bill (H.R. 
3553), Bill Thomas (R. - CO.), who is chairman of 
the key Ways and Means Committee.
Both bills were introduced on December 20, 
2001. The Thomas draft stipulated that Jackson- 
Vanik “should no longer apply to the Russian 
Federation.” While the Lugar proposal carried a 
similar demand, it reflected a more critical 
viewpoint. The powerful senator from Indiana was 
widely known as especially sensitive to 
international affairs, and it was no accident that he 
would call attention to the fact that the very 
existence of the amendment “continues to be a 
major irritant in U.S. relations with Russia.”21 The 
perspective echoed that held by the State 
Department.
Of equal significance to the direct prompting of 
congressional legislation was the active 
encouragement by the Administration of a key
19 Congressional Research Service, Permanent Normal Trade 
Relations (PNTR) Status for Russia and U.S. - Russian 
Economic Ties (Washington: Library of Congress, February 26, 
2002), pp. 1-2. Since the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia and 
Lithuania had never been recognized by the U.S. as part of the 
Soviet Union, they were each quickly granted normal trading 
relations once the Soviet Union collapsed in December 1990. 
Two other former Soviet Republics — Kyrgyzstan and Georgia 
— were “graduated” out of Jackson-Vanik in the year 2000, the 
first on June 29, the second on December 29. These exceptions 
were initiated by an Administration favorably disposed towards 
the two republics and besides, no ethnic emigration issue were 
to be found with them. Congress responded favorably to the 
Administration requests.
0 Congressional Record-Senate, (Washington, D.C.:
Government Printing Office, December 20, 2001), p. 9. A copy 
of his legislation introduced into the Senate at the 107“' 
Congress, 1st Session was made available for the author. A 
copy of the Thomas Bill was also given to the author.
21 Ibid. Lugar made explicitly clear that this viewpoint was
reported as such by the Administration.
legislator whose credentials in the human rights 
field are impeccable. If a major landmark in 
human rights is to be modified, or at least one of 
its principal targets no longer included, it would be 
especially appropriate to have a leading human 
rights advocate involved on the Administration 
side. No senator or congressman has better 
credentials than Republican Tom Lantos (D. - 
CA.). He is the only survivor of the Holocaust 
ever elected to Congress and he is the founding 
chairman of the Congressional Human Rights 
Caucus. Besides, he is the ranking Democrat in 
the House International Affairs Committee.
According to Lantos’ own personal testimony 
to a House trade panel, which is subordinate to the 
Ways and Means Committee, he was asked by “the 
White House... to lead the effort to repeal 
Jackson-Vanik.”22 Lantos related that “he agreed 
to do that because I felt that the President needed 
all the support we could give him on a bipartisan 
basis in post-September 11 environment.” Lantos 
added that he wanted to help the President fulfill 
his promise to Putin “prior” to the summit 
scheduled for Moscow in late May 2002.
Even before the Administration legislation was 
introduced in the House and Senate, Lantos 
circulated among his colleagues a draft outline for 
legislation which differed in a significant way from 
the Lugar and Thomas measures. The date of the 
draft outline was December 11, nine days ahead of 
the officially-sponsored legislation. Instead of 
simply calling for the lifting of the Jackson-Vanik 
amendment as it applied to Russia, Lantos’ draft 
urged that Congressional legislation stipulate that 
the Kremlin should adopt specific “statutory and 
administrative procedure” for assuring everyone of 
the “right to emigrate [and] travel freely.”23
In addition, the Lantos outline would signal the 
Russians what especially was welcomed by the 
U.S. The proposed congressional legislation would 
endorse legal initiatives undertaken by Moscow to 
combat “incitement to violence” against ethnic 
groups and which specifically outlawed “hate 
crime.” Clearly, as a human rights specialist, 
Lantos sought a legislation initiative that would 
establish distinctive human rights markers for 
Russian compliance. At the same time, his draft
22 Committee on Ways and Means, Trade Subcommittee, To 
Explore the Permanent Trade Relations for Russia: Hearing, 
April 11, 2002, p. 9.
23 The “December Draft,” officially introduced at the 107“’ 
Congress at its Is1 Session on December 11,2001, was made 
available to the author. The cited comments are to be found in 
the first four pages of the document.
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outline avoided any suggestion that the lifting of 
the amendment be conditioned upon Moscow’s 
adherence to human rights requirements. Still, he 
believed, there ought to be a carry over from 
Jackson-Vanik.
By April 11, 2002, when hearings opened by a 
subcommittee on trade of the House Ways and 
Means Committee, chaired by Congressman Philip 
Crane (R. - ILL.), Lantos offered rather precise 
details of what the Hose legislation should contain. 
In his testimony, Lantos first took note that he had 
consulted leaders of a number of religious and 
human rights organizations as he needed to stress 
that Jackson-Vanik was “one of the first attempts 
to link human rights and trade” and that the 
amendment “was initially conceived to establish a 
framework for U.S. trade relations with communist 
countries.”
When viewed from this perspective, Lantos 
emphasized, Jackson-Vanik “has been a 
resounding and an unqualified success.” He listed 
the extraordinary progress in Russia since the end 
of the Cold War: open borders; no legal 
restrictions on emigration; and travel abroad no 
longer encumbered. Besides, important progress 
has been made in many other human rights areas. 
Progress, he thought, “has been substantial.”
At the same time, Lantos stressed in his written 
testimony, that “as we graduate Russia from 
Jackson-Vanik, we [must] reaffirm out 
commitment to the human rights provisions that 
are the foundation of this legislation.”24 What 
must be stressed to Russia and all other 
governments covered by Jackson-Vanik is “that 
observance of human rights is an essential element 
in the relationship with the United States.” Thus, 
Lantos proposed that the “graduation” legislation 
express America’s “intention to pursue human 
rights issues as part of our ongoing foreign policy 
approach to Russia.” He indirectly offered several 
examples of what the U.S. would and should raise. 
Observing that while “good” laws have been 
passed to combat hate crimes, they have been 
enforced “unevenly,” notably in responding to and 
condemnation of “egregious” anti-Semitic abuses. 
Also noted was the fact that religious and ethnic 
minorities have faced “obstacles” in reclaiming 
houses of worship from local authorities.
It is apparent that Lantos conceived of the U.S. 
role in trade matters as embracing a human rights 
component and he sought in the “graduation” 
procedure to give his perspective an appropriate
send-off. Moreover, he advanced the specific 
notion of creating an “informal U.S.-Russian 
forum to discuss...[human rights] issues on a 
regular basis.” To be included in the forum from 
the American side would be the National 
Conference on Soviet Jewry and the U.S. 
Commission for International Religious Freedom. 
Whether the forum idea should be included in the 
proposed legislation or separately negotiated was 
not made clear.
Significantly, Lantos did not see his proposals 
as presenting an obstacle to the “graduation” 
procedure. He repeatedly stressed that he wished to 
see the Jackson-Vanik amendment lifted in time 
for the Bush-Putin summit in Moscow near the end 
of May. Firmly, the Lantos statement stressed: “I 
anticipate that an agreement can be reached” on 
the human rights issues raised. Indeed, he 
envisaged that the “graduation” process be 
climaxed with a “festive event” in Moscow to 
which Charles Vanik and the widow of the late 
Henry Jackson—Helen Jackson—would be 
invited. Celebration would be appropriate, for in 
Lantos’ view, “Jackson-Vanik represented one of 
America’s signal victories in the Cold War and 
marked an historic milestone for the human rights 
movement.”
In oral testimony on April 11, Lantos went 
beyond his earlier statement.25 Once again, he 
stressed the great importance of Jackson-Vanik 
but, this time with a special appreciation of the 
powerful leverage it provided to achieve human 
rights purposes. It succeeded he said, “in prying 
open the iron gates of the Soviet Union. 
Thousands of persecuted Soviet citizens were 
permitted to emigrate....” The unique value was 
to be found in its unprecedented character. Lantos 
noted that the Jackson-Vanik amendment was “the 
first case in which Congress imposed economic 
sanctions in order to achieve a human rights 
objective.” It was for this reason alone that the 
“legacy” of the legislation must be preserved and 
Lantos was prepared to go a long way to preserve 
the “legacy” through special language in the 
graduation legislation.
For the first time, Lantos spoke of the need for 
“an appropriate reporting requirement so that 
Congress can be kept abreast of developments” 
related to human rights. How the “appropriate 
reporting mechanism would work was not made 
clear. It may be that it would find expression in 
the “forum” idea that he had proposed in his
24 See the Lantos testimony in ibid. 25 His tough language is on page 9 of the Internet testimony.
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testimony. But that Lantos was profoundly serious 
about maintaining the Jackson-Vanik “legacy” is 
all too evident. He told the trade subcommittee 
that unless the “graduation” legislation expressed 
his “human rights concerns” about the future, he 
“will not support the legislation” and, indeed, he 
“will have to oppose it actively.” That it was a 
deeply-felt warning shot across the congressional 
bow is stunningly evident. Yet, at no time did he 
overtly reject the notion of “graduation” and, in 
fact, he was unquestionably optimistic that his 
“legacy” concern would win approval.
In his oral presentation, Lantos acknowledged 
that he had discussed his “concern” with National 
Security Advisor Condoleeza Rice and with 
Deputy Secretary of State, Richard Armitage. 
Both indicated to him “that they understand and 
fully share...[his] concerns.” For that reason, 
Lantos held firmly to the belief that “we can find 
satisfactory appropriate language.” After all, the 
Bush Administration now seemed to provide the 
“legacy” thesis with an appropriate blessing.
Certainly, President Bush had to focus upon 
key members of Congress if he intended to fulfill 
his commitment to Putin. But, beyond Congress, 
and of central importance in affecting Congress, 
was the Jewish community, specifically that 
community agency which had been designated to 
deal with the former Soviet Union, the National 
Conference of Soviet Jewry. The NCSJ, from the 
beginning, had proved to be the prime instrument 
for mobilizing public and congressional sentiment.
The Bush Administration lost no time to win 
over the NCSJ. Only four days after the Crawford 
summit, President Bush sent the executive director 
of the NCSJ, Mark Levin, a personal letter.26 The 
President’s letter was basically designed to 
communicate a sense of finality about Jackson- 
Vanik. On the one hand, NCSJ was formally 
advised on November 19 that President Vladimir 
Putin had given President Bush “clear assurances” 
of the Kremlin’s intention “to promote.. .core 
human rights and basic freedoms.” The White 
House went on to offer congratulations in such a 
way as if to say that the purpose of Jackson-Vanik 
had been fully realized.
Thus, the President wrote that it was American 
Jewry’s determination “to defend the rights of 
Soviet Jewry” that “won a once unthinkable 
victory” regarding free emigration and, therewith, 
achieving “a significant change” in the practices of
-<> A copy of the Bush teller was made available by Mark Levin
to the author.
the Kremlin. The effusively laudatory comment 
was designed to demonstrate that Jackson-Vanik 
was no longer necessary.
The response of the NCSJ leadership was 
strongly positive. How could it be otherwise, 
especially since Putin had sent his Prime Minister, 
Mikhail Kasyanov, to meet in a friendly session 
Mark Levin and several other professionals of 
major Jewish organizations? It was an off-the- 
record meeting on January 31, 2000, held at the 
Russian Embassy in Washington, D.C. Kasyanov 
was accompanied by Russian Deputy Foreign 
Minister Georgy Mamedov and Russia’s 
Ambassador to the U.S. Yuri Ushakov.27 
Kasyanov expressed appreciation for what he 
believed to be a positive relationship between 
Moscow and American Jewish organizations 
including the latter’s support for removing 
Jackson-Vanik.
In response, Levin thanked the Prime Minister 
for Russia’s assistance in the fight against global 
terrorism, its deepening relationship with Israel 
and its support for the revival of Jewish culture in 
Russia. He went on to assure Kasyanov that the 
American Jewish community is vigorously 
supporting Russia’s “graduation” from Jackson- 
Vanik and, in keeping with this aim, is working 
closely with Congress and the Bush 
Administration. At the House trade panel hearings 
on April 11, NCSJ offered little doubt about where 
it stood. Its chairman, Harold Luks, reiterated 
twice that his organization supports “the 
graduation of Russia from the Jackson-Vanik 
amendment.”28 * * * *No qualifying phases or pre-
conditions were offered. However, Luks did take 
note of several negative factors in Russia, 
including anti-Semitic incidents, certain police 
interference with Jewish synagogues and 
difficulties with the registration provisions of 
Moscow’s 1997 law on religion.
It was in the context of these negative features 
that Luks took the occasion to express concern 
about “the future.” He pointedly acknowledged 
having “some trepidation given the uncertainties in 
the Russian Federation.” Precisely because of the 
concern about “the future,” Luks sought to identify 
himself with ideas and proposals already advanced
27 The author relied upon notes of the meeting later dictated by
one of the participants. A copy of the notes is in the author’s
possession.
The testimony is to be found in the Hearing of the
Subcommittee on Trade, To Explore Normal Trade Relations
for Russia, p. 34.
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by Congressman Lantos.29 The NCSJ chairman 
suggested that the House Ways and Means 
Committee “address some of the bilateral 
mechanisms” to which Lantos referred when he 
proposed a specific “forum” for follow-through.
Bush’s promise to Putin about congressional 
“graduation” of Russia from Jackson-Vanik 
seemed near fulfillment as spring 2002 
approached. All that required adjusting was the 
incorporation of certain human rights language in 
the legislation granting Russia permanent and 
normal trade relations with the U.S. Such 
language would reflect concerns of Lantos and the 
Jewish community for future Russian human rights 
behavior. That behavior would require some form 
of monitoring but not at the expense of the 
completed “graduation” process. That the May 23 
summit would be consummated not merely by a 
reduction of missiles but by a trade breakthrough 
seemed all but assured.
The Chicken Embargo
It was not to be. A sudden and unexpected 
Kremlin decision on March 10 struck havoc with 
the scheduled optimism.30 Imports of American 
poultry were banned on grounds of salmonella 
infection and the supposed use of antibiotics. 
While a very small number of U.S. poultry plants 
had sold Russia the infected chickens, this was not 
perceived as the rationale for Moscow’s actions. 
An official report by the staff of the House trade 
panel speculated that the ban could be “retaliation” 
for the U.S.-imposed embargo on Russian and 
European steel. Similar perceptions were reported 
in The Moscow Times3' and Radio Free 
Europe/Radio Liberty.32 Arbitrary and unilateral 
trade actions can trigger unexpected consequences.
The sudden Kremlin ban was similarly not 
inconsequential for the American economy. 
According to the House panel staff report, one-half 
of all U.S. poultry exports go to Russia; indeed,
29 Ibid., p. 35.
30 The “Memorandum” is from the “Trade Subcommittee Staff’ 
to Members, Subcommittee on Trade.” It is misdated as “April 
10, 2002” and, instead should read “April 11, 2002.” The 
Memorandum is on official Subcommittee stationery noting 
that the primary group is the House Committee on Ways and 
Means of the U.S. Congress. The reference is on page 2.
31 Alla Startseva, “Despite Lifting of Ban U.S. Birds Still 
Frozen,” The Moscow Times, May 15, 2002, p. 5.
32 “Russia Lifts Ban on U.S. Poultry Imports,” REERL Security 
Watch, April 23, 2002.
poultry constitutes 20 percent of total U.S. exports 
to Moscow.33
That the impact on the Congress would be 
grave is self-evident. As many as 38 American 
states export chickens to Russia. Their senators 
and representatives could not fail to be extremely 
sensitive to the Russian decision. The U.S. 
Ambassador to Russia, Alexander Vershbow, told 
the Moscow press that the poultry ban has “raised 
serious concerns in both Houses of Congress” and 
posed the question whether “now is the time to 
give Russia normal trading relations.”34 The 
chairman of the House trade subcommittee, 
Congressman Philip Crane (R. - ILL.), angrily told 
Russian Ambassador Yuri Ushakov on April 11— 
he had testified at the hearings—that Moscow’s 
erection of trade barriers “has caused serious 
damage to our trade relationship and I ask you, Mr. 
Ambassador to send this message home.”35 
Clearly the Kremlin had badly miscalculated the 
significance of Congress as it had during the era of 
Jackson-Vanik.
Nonetheless, it soon became clear that no one 
wanted a collapse of the Crawford agreement. 
Following a March 27 telephone call by Bush to 
Putin, Russia formally lifted the ban on April 15.36 
However, by then, Moscow’s veterinary service 
had already cancelled all import permits.37 But on 
the eve of the Moscow summit, U.S. Agriculture 
Secretary Ann Veneman spoke by phone with her 
Russian counterpart, Alexei Gordeyev, and rapid 
approval was given for two U.S. freighters moored 
in St. Petersburg harbor to unload their frozen 
poultry.38 To legitimate the decision, a high 
Kremlin official said the U.S. government had 
“presented official guarantees that the poultry is 
safe.”
Moscow’s reversal portended a positive 
outcome. Too much was at stake in the new 
American-Russian relationship for a return to 
counterproductive unilateral steps. “Graduation” 
of Russia can be expected once effective human 
rights language is incorporated into the proposed 
legislation. The language of the statute ending 
Jackson-Vanik’s applicability to Russia must
33 Memorandum from Trade Subcommittee Staff, April 10, 
2001 [should read 2002], p. 2.
34 Cited in Startseva, op. cit., p. 8.
35 To Explore Permanent Normal Trade Relations with Russia, 
Hearing, April 11, 2002, p. 6.
36 Memorandum from Trade Subcommittee Staff, op. cit., p. 2.
37 Alla Startseva, “U.S. Poultry Freed Ahead of Summit,” The 




surely resonate with some concern about a possible 
future limitation on emigration or about an 
outpouring of anti-Semitism. That would provide 
a legacy to Jackson’s amendment commensurate 
with the “miracle” of the massive exodus to 
freedom.
Jewish groups, which have been closely 
following the “graduation” proceedings just as 
they had the Jackson-Vanik from the early 
seventies, were reported as “hopeful the legislation 
will pass by the end of the year.”39
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